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EQUIVALENCE OF RIGHT OF ENTRY AND
RIGHT OF REVERTER
A possibility of reverter is a future interest created in the grantor
of a determinable fee. A right of entry for condition broken is a
future interest created in the grantor of a fee on condition subsequent.'
It is commonly said that a possibility of reverter takes effect "auto-
matically" upon the occurrence of the event on which the determinable
fee is limited2 whereas a right of entry for condition broken does not
take effect "automatically", but only when the holder of the right
of entry has effected a forfeiture following a breach of the condition
subsequent.3 The automatic nature of a possibility of reverter is said
to be important for a number of situations some of which are as follows:
1. On the' occurrence of the event upon. which a
determinable fee is limited, the holder of the possibility of
reverter automatically becomes seised of the fee. His wife,
therefore, gains an inchoate right of dower immediately. But
on a breach of a condition subsequent the wife of the holder of
the right of entry acquires an inchoate right of dower only after
her husband has effected a forfeiture.4 If the husband dies be-
fore effecting a' forfeiture, his wife never acquires a right of
dower.
2. Statutes of limitation relating to the recovery of real
property begin to run against the holder of a right of entry
only after he has effected a forfeiture of the prior estate. 5
The implication is that the statutes begin to run against the
holder of a possibility of reverter upon the occurrence of the
event on which the determinable fee is limited.
3. Creditors are generally allowed to reach any property
interest of the debtor which is alienable intervivos.' After the
occurrence of the event on which a determinable fee is limited,
1 A right of entry may spring into existence when a condition subsequent is
attached to either a fee simple, a fee tail, a life estate or a term for years. I SIMES
AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §252 (1956). In this paper, however, a right of
entry will be used to refer only to the future interest which exists in conjunction
with a fee on condition.
For alternate terminology see 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Introductory note
to Ch. 4 (1936) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, §155 (1936) ; 1 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE
INTERESTS 270, n. 1 (1956).
21 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 427 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY §23 (1936) ; 1 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS 330 (1956).
31 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 418 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY §24, Comment b (1936); 1 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS 272
(1956).
4 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, ILLINOIS FUTURE INTERESTS 70-71 (1941) ; 1 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY 643 (Casner ed. 1952) ; 1 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS,
326 (1956).
5I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 426 (Casner ed. 1952).
6 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 538 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY §§166, 167 (1936) ; 4 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS 210 (1956).
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the holder of the possibility of reverter is automatically invested
with the fee. A fee is obviously alienable. But even after breach
of the condition subsequent, the holder of the right of entry
who has not effected a forfeiture has only a right of entry.
Rights of entry are generally not alienable, even after breach
of the condition subsequent.'
Although the foregoing list does not include all the situations where
it is said to be important to know whether a future interest takes effect
automatically, it does include some of the situations very commonly
mentioned.
Do solutions to the problems listed above really depend on whether
the future interest takes effect automatically rather than by forfeiture?
If not, it becomes unnecessary to distinguish between rights of entry and
possibilities of reverter in deciding whether a widow has dower, whether
a creditor has any rights or whether a statute of limitation has run.
If it is found that there is no need to distinguish between possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry in solving other problems, there arises a
question of the desirability of retaining the distinction. Before beginning
an investigation to determine whether important consequences attach
to the fact that a future interest is designated a right of entry rather
than a possibility of reverter, it seems appropriate to review briefly the
nature of these interests and the language needed for their creation.
A determinable fee is an estate of indefinite duration which termi-
nates automatically upon the occurrence of some specified event.' Upon
the termination of the determinable fee, the holder of the corresponding
possibility of reverter becomes vested with the fee. The possibility of
reverter must originally have been created in the grantor of the determin-
able fee or in his successor.9
A fee on condition subsequent is of potentially infinite duration."0
But it is terminated only when (1) a specified event occurs and (2) the
holder of the right of entry effects a forfeiture of the fee on condition
and thereby invests the fee in himself." The right of entry must originally
7 1 ANMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §4.68 (Casner ed. (1952); RESTATEMENTS
PROPEITY §160, Comment b (1936); 4 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §1862
(1956).
8 A determinable fee may be limited on an event certain to occur, e.g., "so
long as the oak tree stands . . ." But if the event is certain to occur at or before
the death of some designated person [e.g., while May remains a widow] the
estate is likely to be considered a life estate. See 1 SIIEs AND SMITH, FUTURE
INTERESTS 337 (1956); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY 44, Comment i (1936).
91 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY 427 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY §154, Comment b (1936); 1 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS 327
(1956).
10A fee may be given on a condition subsequent which is certain to occur,
e.g., "but when A dies . . ." RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §45, Illustration 6, (1936).
Yet the fee on condition may last forever if the holder of the right of entry fails
to effect a fortfeiture of the fee within a reasonable time after breach of the
condition subsequent. See STATUTES OF LIMITATION, infra.
11 See note 3, supra.
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have been created in the grantor of the fee on condition subsequent or in
his successor.
1 2
The event which terminates a determinable fee can be identical to
the event specified in a fee on condition subsequent. Consequently it is
impossible to distinguish the interests by the nature of the event. The
only way to determine which of the two interests has been created is by
examining the donor's choice of language.
By long settled construction the words "so long as," "during,"
or "until" are deemed to create a determinable fee, while the words
"but if," "provided that," and "on condition that" are deemed to create
a fee on condition subsequent."
With this background in mind an attempt will now be made to
determine the extent to which the statements in the preceding list are,
or may be, inaccurate. The discussion will not be limited to an investiga-
tion of the inaccuracies arising from contemporary cases and statutes but
will include references to inaccuracies which might arise from future
cases when there are no cases in point.
DOWER
A widow's right to dower in the lands of her deceased husband
depends in general on the husband's having been seised of the land dur-
ing coverture.14 There are many statements to the effect that the holder
of a right of entry does not become seised of land merely by virtue of a
breach of the condition on which the fee is given but that the fee
on condition must first be forfeited."5 Consequently, if the holder of the
right of entry fails to effect a forfeiture before his death his wife
acquires no dower. It is assumed, however, that the holder of a possibility
of reverter becomes seised of the fee and that his wife thereby gains art
inchoate right of dower immediately upon the occurrence of the
event limiting the determinable fee.16
The only cases discovered by the author which hold that a widow
acquires no dower in land to which her husband at his death held an
unexercised right of entry are in England and Missouri." These cases
have all been overruled by statute."8 Consequently, a wife acquires an
12 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 417 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY §155 (1936); 1 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS 271 (1956).
13 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §2.6 (Casner ed. 1952); 1 SIMES AND
SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §§247, 286 (1956).
14 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 640 (Casner ed. 1952).
15 Ibid.
16 See CAREY AND SCHUYLER, ILLINOIS FUTURE INTERESTS 70-71 (1941).
17Ellis v. Kyger, 90 Mo. 600, 3 SAV. 23 (1886), and cases cited in PERKINS,
PROFITABLE BOOK §§366, 367 (1836).
183 & 4 WM. IV, c. 105, §5 (1833); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN., §340 (1939).
By a more recent statute, Missouri has completely abolished dower. Mo. PROBATE
CODE, §474.10 (1955). Other statutes similar to 3 & 4 WM. are VA. CODE ANN.
§64-28 (1950), and W. VA. CODE ANN., §4097 (1955).
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inchoate right of dower when the specified event occurs even though the
husband has not effected a forfeiture.
It is incorrect to assume that a wife of one who has a possibility
of reverter always acquires an inchoate right of dower upon the occurrence
of the event on which the determinable fee is limited. Dower generally
requires that the husband be seised during coverture."9 Seisin either in deed
or in law is sufficient.2" Seisin in deed requires actual possession.21 Seisin in
law requires (1) that there be an immediate right to possession, and (2)
that the land be possessed by no other person.2 If then the land was in
the possession of someone other than the husband during the period be-
tween the occurrence of the specified event and the husband's death, the
wife gained no inchoate right of dower because the husband never acquired
seisin either in deed or in law. This conclusion follows whether the hus-
band had a right of entry or a possibility of reverter.
STATUTES OF LIMITATION
It is generally said that statutes of limitation relating to the recovery
of real property do not begin to run against the holder of a right of entry
until he has effected a forfeiture of the corresponding fee on condition
subsequent.2 3 The implication of such statements is that the statutes begin
to run against the holder of a possibility of reverter immediately upon
the occurrence of the event on which the estate is limited. If the f ore-
going propositions are unqualifiedly true, the importance of distinguishing
between a right of entry and a possibility of reverter is obvious. Upon
examination, however, it appears that in many situations where statutes of
limitation are involved results do not depend on whether a right of entry
or possibility of reverter is found to exist.
Some states have statutes which run against rights of entry and
possibilities of reverter even though the specified event has not occurred. 24
Some states have statutes which provide explicitly for the running of
the statutes either upon the occurrence of the event limiting a determinable
19 See note 16, supra.
20 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 640 (1952); WILLIAMS, SETTLEMENTS 82
(1876).
21 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 640 (1952) ; LIGHTWOOD, POSSESSION 5 (1894).
22 Savage v. Savage, 85 Cal. 418, 23 P. S90 (1890); Martin v. Trail, 142
Mo. 85, 43 S.W. 655 (1897); MAITLAND, THE MYSTERY OF SEISIN, in 3 SELECt
ESSAYS ON ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 597 (1909); WATKINS, DESCENTS 34-
(4th ed. 1837).
23 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 602 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 SIMES AND
SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §1966 (1956).
Whether the statute limits an action "from the time when the cause of action
first accrues," e.g., N. H. REv. STAT. ANN., c. 508, §2 (1955) or from the time
when the claimant or his predecessor in title was "seised" or "in possession", e.g.,
S. C. CODE ANN., §10-126 (1952), is deemed irrelevant. 4 SIMES AND SMITH,
FUTURE INTERESTS, 239-40 (1956).
24 See e.g., S. D. CODE §33.0228 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN., §28-201 (1955);
WASH. REV. CODE §7.28.070 (1951); 4 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §1963
(1956).
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fee or upon the breach of the condition subsequent of a fee on condition. 25
Additional states have statutes which have been construed as providing
equal treatment in such circumstances for both rights of entry and possi-
bilities of reverter. 6 And it seems probable that the statutes in many states
where the problem has not arisen would be construed to provide equal
treatment.
2 7
Even those jurisdictions which hold that the statute of limitation
does not run against the holder of a right of entry until he has effected
a forfeiture do not allow the holder an indefinite period of time in which
to effect a forfeiture. He is limited to a "reasonable" period of time.
28
One court has held that any period which does not exceed the period
allowed by the statute of limitation is reasonable.2" It is but a short
step (not a necessary one, however) to the conclusion that any period
which exceeds that allowed by the statute of limitation is unreasonable. 30
Thus, under certain circumstances, it would be unnecessary to distinguish
between rights of entry and possibilities of reverter even though the
statute is deemed to commence running at different times.
Assume that the statute begins running against the holder of a
possibility of reverter upon the occurrence of the specified event and that
it begins running against the holder of a right of entry only when
the fee on condition has been forfeited. Assume also that exercise of the
right of entry is limited by reference to the statute of limitation and
that the holder of the right of entry has done nothing which amounts to
an election to forfeit the fee on condition subsequent. If then, the event
25 SEE e.g., ILL. S.H.A., c. 83 §1la (1956) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN., §27.595 (1938);
MASS. ANN. LAWS, C. 260 §23 (1956).
26 See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT., c. 118, Art. 8-4- (1953), interpreted in Wolf v.
Hollenbeck, 109 Colo. 70, 123 P. 2d 412 (1942) ; CONN. GEN. STAT., §8314 (1949),
interpreted in Nearing v. City of Bridgeport, 137 Conn. 205, 75 A 2d 505 (1950) ;
and VA. CODE ANN., c. 8, §5 (1950) interpreted in Sanford v. Sims, 191 Va. 644,
66 S. E. 2d 459 (1951). See also ILL. REV. STAT., c. 83, §3 (1953) [the predecessor
of the present Illinois statute, supra, note 25] interpreted in Starke v. Penn Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 390 Ill. 619, 61 N. E. 2d 552 (1945).
27 See for example the New Hampshire statute: "No action for the recovery
of real estate shall be brought after twenty years from the time the right to
recover first accrued to the party claiming it, or to some person under whom
he claims." N. H. REV. STAT. ANN., c. 508, §2, (1955).
Compare it with CONN. GEN. STAT., 8314 (1949), which was construed in
Nearing v. City of Bridgeport, supra, note 26 to begin running against the right
of entry as soon as the condition subsequent was broken: "No person shall make
entry into any lands or tenements but within fifteen years after his right or title
to the same shall first descend or accrue . . ."
28 1 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS 310 (1956).
29 Zazos & Miss. Valley R. R. Co. v. Lakeview Traction Co., 100 Miss.
281, 56 So. 393 (1911).
30Jeffries v. State for Use of Woodruff Co., 216 Ark. 657, 226 S. W. 2d
810 (1950).
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specified in the fee on condition subsequent can occur only once"' there
is no need to distinguish between rights of entry and possibilities of
reverter. For after the expiration of a period of time determined by
reference to a statute of limitation, a determinable fee becomes a fee
simple by virtue of the doctrine of adverse possession and a fee on con-
dition can never be forfeited even though technically a right of entry still
exists. The fee on condition can never be forfeited because by hypothesis
the condition subsequent was capable of occurring only once and a
forfeiture for that one breach has already been barred by the lapse of an
unreasonably long period of time. If however, the event specified in a
fee on condition is capable of occurring more than once,32 the expiration
of a period of time corresponding to the period of the statute of limitation
will not necessarily prevent a foreiture from ever occurring. The ex-
piration of time prevents exercise of the right of entry only for past
breaches but not necessarily for future breaches.
Many of the events specified in a fee on condition subsequent or in
a determinable fee are of a "continuous" nature.3 These events have
on occasion been deemed single and indivisible and on occasion separate
and distinct.3 4
Thus far, the discussion relating to statutes of limitation has been
concerned with situations where both rights of entry and possibilities
of reverter become ineffective at the same time and where this time
is computed from the date that the condition subsequent or the event
limiting the determinable fee occurred. It is possible, however, that both
rights of entry and possibilities of reverter remain effective after the
occurrence of the specified event for a period exceeding the period of the
statute of limitation.
For example, statutes of limitation do not begin running against
the holder of a right of entry when the condition subsequent occurs but
only when a forfeiture is declared."5 And they do not run against tenants
at sufferance until the "landlord" has made an election to treat the
ctenant?' as a wrongdoer rather than as a "tenant,"3 6 or until the tenant
31 An example of an event capable of occurring only once is, "When St.
Paul's Church falls . . ."
32An example of an event capable of occurring more than once is, "If my
widow should ever marry . . ."
33 1 SIMs AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §259 (1956). An example of a
continuing breach is use of land for non-church purposes when the deed specifies
that the land be used for church purposes.
34See e.g., City of New York v. Coney Island Fire Dept., 285 N. Y. 535,
32 N. E. 2d 827 (1941), affirming 255 App. Div. 286, 18 N.Y.S. 2d 923 (1940),
(where a use for non-fire purposes in a conveyance requiring use for fire pur-
poses was deemed by implication to be several distinct breaches) and Barrie v.
Smith, 47 Mich. 130, 10 N. W. 168 (1881), (where a sale of intoxicating liquors
was held to be a single and entire breach).
35 See note 26, supra.
36 1 ANIERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY 236 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 WALSH, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 178-9 (1947).
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has given notice to the landlord of the hostile nature of his possession."7
According to the definition given in the Restatement one who holds over
after the occurrence of the event limiting a determinable fee could be
considered a tenant at sufferance.3" Thus, in a jurisdiction adopting these
views it would be unnecessary to distinguish between a right of entry
and a possibility of reverter where the owner of the future interest has
done nothing which amounts either to a forfeiture or to an election
and the tenant has not put the landlord on notice 'by his hostile acts.
CREDITORS' RIGHrS
The rights of creditors to a particular property interest generally
depend on the alienability of the interest.3 9 Rights of entry, in the absence
of statutes, are generally held inalienable.40 Thus even after the oc-
currence of the event on which the fee on condition subsequent is limited,
there is nothing that creditors can reach until a forfeiture is effected.
But after the occurrence of the event on which the determinable fee is
limited, the holder of the possibility of reverter automatically acquires a
fee simple which, of course, is alienable and therefore subject to attach-
ment. It should be noted that creditors are treated similarly with respect
to these interests after the specified event has occurred only where the
right of entry is alienable. The holder of the possibility of reverter acquires
the fee upon the occurrence of the event so that creditors may reach the
interest irrespective of the alienability of the possibility of reverter. But
since a right of entry remains only a right of entry until forfeiture,
creditors can reach it only if it is alienable.
Many states have statutes which provide explicitly that rights of
entry are alienable. 4 Therefore they would be subject to creditors' claims.
Many states have statutes which have been construed as making rights
of entry alienable.4" There are also a large number of states which
have no decisions on the alienability of rights of entry.43 At least some
373 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 792 n. 3 (Casner ed. 1952).
38"An estate at sufferance is an interest in land which exists when a
person who had a possessory interest in land by virtue of an effective convey-
ance, wrongfully continues in the possession of the land after the termination of
such interest, but without asserting a claim to a superior title." RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY §22 (1936).
39 See note 7, supra.
40 See note 8, supra.
41 CAL. CIL CODE ANN., §1046 (1954); CONN. GEN. STAT., §7118 (1949);
IDAHO CODE ANN., §55-502 (1948); MicE. STAT. ANN., §26.851 (1953); MINN.
STAT. ANN., §500.16 (1947); N.J. STAT. ANN., §46.3-7 (1940); -N. M. STAT. ANN.,
§70-1-21 (1953) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN., c. 433, §10 (1938).
42KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §§67-202, 67-208, 77-201 (1949), construed in
Shell Pet. Corp. v. Hollow, 70 F. 2d 811 (C.C.A. 10th 1934); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§381.210, 382.010 (1955), construed in Ky. Coal Lands Co. v. Min. Dev. Co., 295
Fed. 255 (C.C.A. 6th 1924) ; MIsS. CODE ANN., §831 (1942), construed in Hamilton
v. Jackson, 157 Miss. 284, 127 So. 302 (1930) ; VA. CODE ANN., §55-6 (1950),
construed in Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 463, 155 S.E. 802, 77 A.L.R. 324
(1930).
43 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 530 (Casner ed. f952).
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of these have general statutes which would probably be construed as
making both rights of entry and possibilities of reverter subject to creditors'
claims.4
4
At least one state has held that a right of entry is alienable after
breach and, therefore, subject to the claims of creditors even though
inalienable before breach. 45
Although rights of entry are generally held inalienable in the absence
of statute, most states have statutes which either have been or could be
construed as making rights of entry subject to creditors' claims. If the
statutes are so construed there is no need to distinguish between rights of
entry and possibilities of reverter in problems involving creditors' rights.
CONCLUSION
In Sanford v. Sints the judge said, "Technically, perhaps, there is
a distinction between a possibility of reverter and a right of entry for
breach of a condition subsequent; but the distinction is usually not ob-
served and . . [they] are treated the same."46  Although the judge
made no survey of the situations where a distinction between these inter-
ests is unnecessary, his conclusion seems correct with respect to the
problems considered herein.
To summarize: assuming that the specified event which terminates
a determinable fee has occurred or that the condition subsequent of a fee
on condition has been broken, it is unnecessary to distinguish between
rights of entry and possibilities of reverter:
1.) in determining a wife's right to dower in these interests
where
(a.) land was occupied by someone other than the hus-
,band in the period between the occurrence of the
event and the husband's death; or
(b.) dower is by statute expressly given to the wife upon
the occurrence of the event specified in a fee on
condition subsequent;
2.) in determining whether a statute of limitation has run
against the holder of one of these interests where
(a.) statutes have changed the common law rule so that
44 It seems that most states have some general statutes which could be
construed as making rights of entry alienable in view of the fact that the follow-
ing statutes were deemed to have this effect:
"Any person claiming title to real estate may, notwithstanding there may
be an adverse possession thereof, sell and convey his interest therein, in the
same manner and with like effect as if he was in the actual possession thereof."
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §67-208 (1949).
"The word 'land' and the phrases 'real estate' and 'real property,' include
lands, tenements and hereditaments, and all rights thereto and interest therein,
equitable as well as legal." KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §77-201 (1949). Con-
strued in Shell Pet. Corp. v. Hollow, 70 F. 2d 811 (C. C. A. 10th 1934).
4G4 SIMEs AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS 181 n. 91 (1956).
46 192 Va. 644, 64-7, 66 S. E. 2d 495, 497 (1951).
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the statute "runs" irrespective of whether the holder
of a right of entry has effected a forfeiture of the
fee on condition subsequent; or
(b.) the event specified in a fee on condition subsequent
may occur only once and exercise of the right of
entry for a particular breach is limited by reference
to the statute of limitation; or
(c.) where the running of the statute is tolled by virtue
of a tenant at sufferance holding over;
3.) in determining creditors' rights, where rights of entry are
held to be alienable. Alienability may result from express
statutes, general statutes, or even from case law.
It cannot be denied that a widow's right to dower, creditors' claims to
property and the applicability of a statute of limitation sometimes depend
on whether an interest is classified as a right of entry or a possibility of
reverter. But for these particular problems it seems that the distinction
is less significant than generally indicated. It is not unreasonable to suppose,
as the court indicated in Sanford v. Sims,47 that the distinction is unim-
portant for other problems as well. If further study indicated that this
distinction really did lack importance for other problems, there would arise
a question of the desirability of maintaining "a distinction without a
difference."
Even though the distinction were found to be significant for other
problems, an important question would remain, i.e., should contemporary
problems be solved by reference to a distinction -based on ancient history?
Many modern statutes indicate an intent to answer the question
in the negative. Statutes relating to dower, to alienation and to the limita-
tion of actions are examples of dissatisfaction with the results flowing
from the common law distinction.
47 See note 46, supra.
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